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Hegel and realism – constructivism controversy in ethics
Analytic philosophy, which emerged in opposition to Hegel’s philosophy, now seems to be 
returning to him. The analytic return to Hegel began with the critique of classical empiricism 
and has culminated in Robert Brandon’s inferentialism. Nevertheless, it has its ethical facet 
as well. In this paper I address some of the ethical aspects of the analytic turn to Hegel as 
espoused in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. I am particularly interested in inter-
preting Hegel’s philosophy from the perspective of Kant’s notion of autonomy. If, following 
Kant, we assume that „[a]utonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to 
itself,“1 we can attribute to him a certain form of anti-realism or constructivism in ethics. On 
this view, norms and values are not independent of us; on the contrary, they are products of 
our self-legislating will. The question thus arises whether we can see Hegel’s philosophy as a 
continuation of Kant’s constructivism or whether Hegel departs from Kant in the direction of 
ethical realism, without, however, thereby excluding the subject’s autonomy. In contemporary 
Anglo-American philosophy, this issue is a bone of contention, hotly disputed by Robert Pippin 
(who claims that Hegel elaborates on Kant’s idea of self-legislation, imbuing it with historical 
and social meaning) and John McDowell (who interprets Hegel’s philosophy as an expression of 
a realist stance that is necessary for self-legislation to be something other and more than simply 
an arbitrary choice).
It was probably John Rawls who first spoke of Kant’s moral constructivism. In his Political 
Liberalism Rawls wrote:
Another and deeper meaning of autonomy says that the order of moral and political values must be made, 
or itself constituted, by the principles and conceptions of practical reason. Let us refer to this as constitutive 
autonomy. In contrast with rational intuitionism, constitutive autonomy says that the so-called independent 
order of values does not constitute itself but is constituted by the activity, actual or ideal, of practical (human) 
reason itself. I believe this, or something like it, is Kant’s view. His constructivism is deeper and goes to the very 
existence and constitution of the order of values“.2
His line of reasoning was followed by such thinkers as, for example, Jerome Schneewind, Chris-
tine Korsgaard, and Robert Pippin. In broad strokes, Kant’s constructivist and anti-realist stance 
would consist in asserting that norms and values are not „out there“ in the world, that they do 
not exist independently of our acts of legislation, which are rooted in the rational will and not, 
as David Hume contended, in instincts, feelings, and desires. According to Kant, our will is a 
self-legislating will. In a well-known passage in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 
Kant wrote:
Hence the will is not merely subject to the law but subject to it in such a way that it must be viewed as also giving 
the law to itself [als selbstgesetzgebend] and just because of this as first subject to the law (of which it can regard 
itself as the author [Urheber]).3
The foundation of all moral law is thus inherent in the self-legislation of the will, that is, in its 
autonomy. This rule of autonomy can be negatively construed as independence from any external 
1 I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in: I. Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. by M. J. Gregor, Cambridge 
1996, 91.
2 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, 1993, 99–100. 
3 I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 81.
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(empirical) motives determining action. Positively, in turn, it can be construed as self-determina-
tion or self-legislation. In this sense, ethical realism would provide a heteronomous explanation 
of our action since it refers to external causes (desires, inclinations, needs or God’s will). However, 
when viewed from the realist perspective, Kant’s idea of autonomy harbours a certain problem. If 
nothing prior to the normative act of legislating exists, if this act is not anchored in reasons which 
antecede this act, then self-legislating will remains within a normative void and is incapable of 
making a decision that could be anything more than simply an arbitrary choice of these particular 
laws rather than any others. 
In this context, Christine Korsgaard emphasizes that if the will is the cause of action, „it must 
act according to some law or other; a lawless cause is for Kant a kind of contradiction.“4 In other 
words, the will as practical reason cannot be understood as the will acting and choosing without 
reason. And since we derive reasons for action from rules, the free will must act in accordance 
with its laws and principles. If they were imposed from outside, the will would not be free. Hence 
the will itself must establish the principles of its own action. Here a pertinent question forces 
itself upon us: How does the will know what those principles are and why these principles are 
to be selected rather than any other? It looks as if the free will, by imposing this or that prin-
ciple upon itself, must restrict its own freedom in an arbitrary way. Charles Larmore identifies 
a further problem in Kant’s concept. According to him, if autonomy means anything, it means 
self-legislation, or conferring authority upon some principles by imposing these principles on 
onself, thereby acknowledging that they possess an independent relevance that we are simply 
obliged to endorse. Some principles pertaining to our intellectual or practical ways of action are 
undoubtedly of such a character. For example, principles which establish the acceptable margin 
of experimental error. However, the idea of autonomy cannot provide a full account of the author-
ity of principles on which we think or act. This is the case, first of all, because when we impose 
principles on ourselves, we do it for certain reasons: we assume that it is beneficial for us or that 
endorsing these principles will further our interests. „Self-legislation is an activity that takes place 
against a background of reasons that we must previously recognize, whose authority we do not 
establish but rather find ourselves called upon to acknowledge.“5
Secondly, some principles of thought and action (e. g. basic laws of logical inference) are so 
fundamental to our performance that we do not possess any coherent notion of what not acknowl-
edging their relevance would actually mean, and therefore we do not possess any coherent notion 
of what could determine our action in spite of it, what it would be that we should impose on 
ourselves. Such principles can present themselves as categorically binding, independently of our 
interests and desires, but this observation implies that we must be seen as actually imposing these 
principles on ourselves. This reflection leads Larmore to an anti-Kantian conclusion that reason 
is basically a receptive faculty. It is a capacity to perceive and acknowledge the independent rel-
evance of reasons. From Kant’s point of view, as well as from that of his faithful followers, that 
would however imply a heteronomous concept of reason. 
John McDowell heads in a similar direction. He believes that it is difficult to accept the 
image of a self-legislating subject that establishes laws or norms in a normative void. The leg-
islating will must always start with some prior set of reasons and norms on which to base its 
legislating. As he puts it, „the insistence on freedom must cohere with the fact that we always 
find ourselves already subject to norms. Our freedom, which figures in the image as our leg-
islative power, must include a moment of receptivity.“6 McDowell is nevertheless fully aware 
of the fact that moral norms are not part of reality understood as accessible from outside any 
4 Ch. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency. Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Philosophy, Oxford 2008, 321.
5 Ch. Larmore, „Back to Kant? No Way“, in: Inquiry, 46 (2003), 269. 
6 J. McDowell, „Response to ‚Leaving Nature Behind‘“, in: Reading McDowell on „Mind and World“, ed. by N. H. 
Smith, London 2002, 269.
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human perspective on it, from outside our form of life.7 The evaluative thought presents itself 
as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world, just as our perceptual judgements do, so for 
him both are receptive and open to reality. Indeed, moral values as norms are not part of the 
world observed from the external point of view proper to science. Nonetheless, according do 
McDowell, the notion of reality exceeds what science can tell us about it. It also encompasses 
properties including norms and values, which are accessible only from an internal point of 
view. For example, colors and the so-called secondary qualities in general are our subjec-
tive reactions to external stimuli. Norms and values constitute a similar case: they do not 
exist independently of human consciousness and reactions, but it does not mean that they 
are any less real. Like colours, they are part of the objective world, albeit the objective world 
as conceived of from a human perspective. Scientific naturalism, which McDowell calls bald 
naturalism, looks at the world from an Archimedean point. McDowell contrasts this kind of 
naturalism with Aristotelian naturalism, in which ethical values can be discernible only to 
those who have been educated in the way that enables them to see the world from a certain 
ethical perspective. This upbringing creates a man’s second nature, which is what Hegel and 
other German thinkers referred to as Bildung. According to McDowell, one can see a continuity 
between Aristotle and Hegel, though the latter was more conscious of the diversity of forms of 
ethical life, resisting at once both relativism and the Kantian division of the world into the phe-
nomenal and the noumenal realms. McDowell thus sees Hegel as an ethical realist in the sense 
that he accepts a social order of norms and values independent of the individual, in which an 
individual remains entangled and by which his or her action is determined. We could refer 
here to the young Hegel’s critique of Kantian ethics. I do not think that contemporary analytic 
appraisals of the Kantian idea of autonomy and moral law go far beyond Hegel’s critique. 
However, is not ethical realism (including that of the Hegelian type) a threat to the auton-
omy and freedom of the individual? If autonomy means, in the first place, that subjects are not 
subordinated in their moral decisions to an alien will, e. g. God’s or society’s will, and, sec-
ondly, that subjects can determine on their own whether their actions are right or wrong, then 
autonomy does not preclude realism. According to McDowell, this does not lead to contradic-
tion since a moral agent can be aware that in certain situations s/he is required to act in a given 
way. In such cases the awareness consists in acknowledging moral reasons, and motivation 
for action will inhere in the perception of these reasons rather than in external causes such as 
God’s will or the desire for happiness. In this case an agent’s action cannot be accounted for as 
constrained by an alien will. Agents can clearly perceive the moral properties of a given situa-
tion, which institute their action’s rightness, and in this way they achieve a kind of self-knowl-
edge that underwrites the autonomy of their actions.
However, according to Robert Pippin it is a misconception to interpret Hegel as an ethical 
realist.8 On his view, Hegel is a post-Kantian philosopher and, as such, cannot be placed in the 
line with Aristotle. He tackles Kant’s idea of self-legislation and imbues it with social and histori-
cal meaning. According to Pippin, the difference between Kant and Hegel lies not in the fact that 
the former was a transcendental idealist and the latter a realist, but in the fact that Kant made 
legislation a matter for the individual subject’s practical reason while Hegel made it a matter for 
spirit (Geist) as a collective subject. Hegel claims that we can never encounter normative claims 
as individual, independent, noumenal beings, capable of acting on their own, but only as sub-
jects situated in diverse socially and historically constituted relationships of mutuality. Contrary 
to Kant’s view, self-legislation cannot consist in a singular moment of choice since each act of 
this kind must be conditioned by norms and values proper to the given community of which the 
7 Cp. J. McDowell, Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World, reprinted in his Mind, Value, and Reality, 
Cambridge inter alia, 2002, 128–129.
8 Cp. R. Pippin, „Postscript: On McDowell’s Response to ‚Leaving Nature Behind‘“, in: R. Pippin, The Persistence of 
Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath, Cambridge 2005, 206–20.
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individual is part. In contrast to the realist view, these norms and values do not exist in such a 
way that the community could be said to find or discover them; rather, they are an outcome of 
the collective, historical process of creating them. Importantly, the process is itself conditioned 
by difficulties and predicaments encountered in previous attempts to endorse a certain system of 
norms and values that proved either to be unstable or not to correspond to human pursuits. On 
Hegel’s account of the relevance of the principles and norms that direct our actions, a „decisive 
classificatory procedure or evaluative criterion“ will never be coherent if what we mean by that 
is some „ultimate explanatory principle or basic argumentative strategy.“ There are no rules for 
specifying which principles we should endorse in our discursive practices, just as there are no 
axioms for how to construct such principles. There are no transcendental arguments supporting 
the necessary conditions for all experience. All we can do is adopt a narrative account of way 
we have come to regard some set of rules or a practice as authoritative. Hegel’s phenomenology 
is an example of such an account which always refers to the pre-discursive context of historical 
experience, whose common name is life, as a source of ultimate procedures or principles.“ Our 
description of our basic sense-producing practices is thus always bound up with the description 
of the inconsistencies experienced in the life of Spirit. According to Pippin, Hegel completes the 
Kantian project of self-legislation, but still manages to evade realism by integrating into it his 
characteristic concern with society and historicity. 
Even so, Robert Stern has raised the following objection. If ethical norms are not constructed 
in a moral void, but are always established in opposition to the prior norms which have proven 
unacceptable for this or that reason, i. e. if moral aporiae are treated as a rationale for rejecting 
some of those norms and constituting new ones, then the wish to avoid these aporiae must act as 
precisely the sort of ultimate explanatory principle, general regulative ideal, or basic argumenta-
tive strategy that Pippin strove to avoid in his model of self-legislation. Stern writes: 
„It is hard to see, on Pippin’s interpretation, what could entitle Hegel to hold that an aporia in a practice governed 
by certain norms gives those engaged in the practice a reason to overcome that aporia, in such a way that this 
reason has itself got its normative status from the prior aporia in previous practices; rather, it looks as if this reason 
governs the way in which our practices are meant to be constructed, but is not itself constructed in the same 
manner.9 
A fundamental problem of constructivism thus seems to persist. Should Hegel then be interpreted 
as an ethical realist? If there exists an order of norms and values that is independent of us and thus 
not an outcome of our legislation, does it not threaten our autonomy as moral agents? According 
to Stern, here everything depends on how Hegel approaches the validity of morality. The notion of 
obligation is central to Kant’s ethics. For Kant, morality is a result of an act of legislating to which 
a legislator is actually subordinate. In the constructivist account, the source of validity of values 
and norms lies in the fact that they have been commanded to us, not however by an alien will (e. g. 
God’s will), but by ourselves. Abandoning the constructivist stance for the realist one, we would 
face serious difficulty in explaining why some norms and values are binding for us. A realist could 
reply that, by their nature, moral facts themselves oblige us internally, but then s/he says only that 
the right and good are obligatory without actually explaining why it is so and how it happens that 
they become obligatory to us. Moreover, if we discard the model of self-legislating and assume that 
the moral obligations that bind us are commanded (rather than established by us), we arrive at an 
account that seems incompatible with our autonomy. Yet, according to Stern, Hegel showed how 
validity of moral obligations could be understood outside the model of self-legislation without 
impinging on our autonomy. The young Hegel’s struggle against all forms of positivism can serve 
as a telling example here insofar as it initially entails an erasure of the subject’s moral autonomy. 
Hegel is even more radical than Kant. While Kant sought to transfer the source of moral authority 
9 Ibid., 255.
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from God to human beings, Hegel embarked on an even more fundamental examination, asking 
whether the relations between a subject and what s/he should do ought to be conceived in the 
first place as relations of being commanded or bound. Stern points to the early unpublished text 
The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, in particular to the figure of Jesus, who, as Hegel writes, „to 
complete subjection under the law of an alien Lord…opposed not a particular subjection under 
a law of one’s own, the self-coercion of Kantian virtue, but virtues without lordship and without 
submission, i. e. virtues as modifications of love.“10
According to Stern, Hegel liberates us from subordination to any law at all. In this sense he goes 
beyond Kant, whose anthropocentrism can be interpreted as a deification of man who replaces God 
as the originator of moral laws. For Hegel, to escape from submission to the law does not consist 
in locating us beyond the ethical; Hegel discerns in us a fundamental capacity for reconciling our 
desires and characters with what is right in our actions. While in the sphere of morality obligation is 
still felt as a command imposed on a subject, it ceases to be experienced in that way in the sphere of 
Sittlichkeit. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel discusses ethical laws in a more Kantian sense as laws 
which have an absolute authority and power, adding immediately however that,
„on the other hand, they are not something alien to the subject. On the contrary, the subject bears spiritual 
witness to them as to its own essence, in which it has its self-awareness [Selbstgefühl] and lives as in its element 
which is not distinct from itself – a relationship which is immediate and closer to identity than even [a relation-
ship of] faith or trust“.11
Stern interprets this passage in the spirit of the young Hegel’s theological text The Spirit of Chris-
tianity and Its Fate. Hegel’s statement that „the subject bears spiritual witness to them as to its 
own essence,“ means according to Stern that a moral agent and his/her nature become unified 
with ethical laws, at which point it becomes entirely pointless to speak of „inner obligations“. 
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel demonstrates that the case of love, where we do not feel bound 
or obliged by the person we love, has a counterpart in our experience in the social and political 
world. According to Stern, the tension felt by constructivists between realism and autonomy does 
not exist for Hegel. This is not however because Hegel is a constructivist, but because the legalistic 
concept of morality is not the ultimate explanation of our moral action. Pippin may be right that 
for Kant law requires a legislator and that, if the legislator is not God, it must be us. However, from 
the Hegelian perspective the proper response is a critique of the concept of an ethics based on law, 
not the pursuit of a Kantian constructivist account of self-legislation. 
The elimination of the tension between realism and autonomy through love cannot in my 
opinion be Hegel’s last word on the issue. Indeed, already in his Frankfurt period Hegel himself 
identified weak points of this solution. Love is a feeling, and as such is something subjective. 
It lacks the objectivity it would require in order to accomplish a genuine reconciliation of sub-
jectivity and objectivity. In his mature philosophy, particularly in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel 
seeks to mediate between individual autonomy and the objective order of norms and values, but 
he no longer appeals to love to do so. I am thinking here of his concept of ethical life, specifically 
his concept of the state as a sphere of ethical life, in which the antagonism is to be overcome. 
Such an account implies, however, a complex and frequently debated conflict of Moralität and 
Sittlichkeit as well as Hegel’s political philosophy with its central axis of individuality and com-
munity. Viewed from this perspective, the problem of ethical realism and anti-realism (con-
structivism) takes on a different form, even though it does not entirely disappear at all. For if we 
agree with Hegel and other communitarians that freedom and autonomy should be understood 
in the context of mutual human interactions and that the structure of these interactions creates 
a context in which freedom and autonomy become reality and not only an idea, then a rather 
10 G. W. F. Hegel, „The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate“, in: Early Theological Writings, trans. T. M. Knox Philadel-
phia 1971, 244.
11 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet , Cambridge 1991, § 147.
Authenticated | piotrdehnel@wp.pl author's copy
Download Date | 12/9/14 8:35 PM
162   Hegel-Jahrbuch 2014
different problem emerges, whose core is, as Rousseau saw, to understand how can one live in a 
community with others and yet remain a free and autonomous individual.
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